We analyze a new effort at collective political mobilization, sponsored by the Catholic Church in Central America following the demobilization of church-linked liberationist movements since the early 1990s. The current effort strives to re-project social Catholicism into the public arena by drawing on traditional Catholic structures, the cultural legacy of liberationist Catholicism, and a model of democratic organizing promoted by the PICO National Network in the United States.
The theology of liberation that emerged from the Catholic Church in Central America in the 1970s left a polarized political and spiritual legacy. As the movement declined in the early 1990s following the end of the region's civil wars, the Church's public voice largely abated. That is, until recently. In 2003, Catholic bishops of Central America launched a new community organizing effort to reconstitute an effective and renewed effort at Catholic political influence in the region. The effort responded to a number of ecclesial challenges, including the rise of Evangelical Protestant influence and the Catholic Church's own weakened public presence and diminishing political influence. Though not abandoning the methods and structures of mobilization utilized by the Church in the past, the bishops chose to incorporate the techniques of the PICO National Network, a forty year old community organizing network based in the United States. This article analyzes PICO-Central America's early experience, paying particular attention to its roots in U.S. community organizing and Central American Catholicism. We analyze the cultural and structural dimensions of this new, transnational model of Catholic social action, and how its attempts at democratic organizing differ from its sister organization in the highly democratized setting of the United States. Utilizing the resource mobilization/political process framework for analyzing social movements, we argue that the organizational tools and cultural resources provided by the Catholic Church are opening new political opportunities for mobilization.
The article proceeds as follows: We begin by outlining the Central American religious and political context, while considering the implications of community organizing culture for democratic consolidation in the region. We then analyze the cultural and structural dimensions of this new, transnational model of Catholic social action, including its implications for the construction of a post-liberationist Catholic collective identity. Finally, we argue that despite PICO's challenges in Central America, the movement represents a rebirth of Catholic activism in the region and may contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in Central America.
Background and Context
We propose two important contextual historical factors that have either positively or negatively affected PICO's mobilization in Central America. First, following political polarization in the 1970s and 1980s, Central American societies face a profound and ongoing struggle to effectively consolidate democracy culturally and institutionally in stable ways.
Second the Catholic Church, no longer serves as the primary, hegemonic religious force influencing Central American political structures. Rising competition from Evangelical & Pentecostal Christianity has challenged the Catholic monopoly in the region, directly through its own political efforts and indirectly through the influence of a more individualistic and conservative theology (often, not always).
During the 1970s and 1980s in Central America, religious commitments undergirded much of the activism that generated widespread political mobilization. When authoritarian regimes responded to activism with repression and/or violence, such commitments were carried into armed insurrection. Though some of these movements' leaders were driven primarily by ideas of "national liberation" rooted in Marxist social analysis, religious sources of meaning provided much of the movements' broader social appeal. Particularly crucial were grassroots lay communities such as Christian base communities (comunidades eclesiales de base, CEBs, the institutional structures that underlay the Church's "pastoral social" -the Spanish term for the Church's social ministry in poor communities) and the writings of liberation theologians. These liberationist tendencies drove much of the vitality of the Catholic Church in Latin America in the late 20 th century. However, they receded dramatically in the 1990s, in the face of Vatican opposition. Following the defeat of revolutionary political change in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, the Catholic Church gradually turned inward through an emphasis on parish ministry, lay "apostolic" movements, and issues of family and individual morality. Religiously, Protestant growth throughout Central America has meant both a declining percentage of members and lost political influence for the Catholic Church (Steigenga and Cleary 2007; Freston 2008) . Evangelical/Pentecostal Christianity, various expressions of Roman Catholicism, and other alternatives (including gang culture, popular consumer culture, and secular humanitarian worldviews) compete intensely for moral authority in people's lives (Smilde 2007; Brenneman 2011) . Additionally, the significant growth of Central Americans claiming no religious affiliation has eroded Catholic public influence (IUDOP 2009). According to previous studies on Evangelicalism, whose pneumacentric rituals and conservative theology typically encourage personal morality and individual spiritual growth over wider social concerns (Smilde 2007; Steigenga and Cleary 2007) , the growth of such conservative theology may appear to be detrimental to civic engagement. However, scholars have contended that the increasingly pluralistic religious environment may actually promote more community projects and revitalized civic engagement (Froehle 1994; Gaskill 1997; Smith 1994; Stoll 1990) . Though the Roman Catholic Church does maintain a lower public profile than in the past, because parish ministry and the pastoral social continue to link Catholic institutional leaders to the ongoing realities of poverty, social violence, and the traumas of immigration and drug trafficking, the bishops continue to seek a public voice to address social policy.
Connecting with the PICO National Network
Whether the Central American Catholic bishops launched the effort to reclaim public presence in response to the rise of religious competition, or as an expression of Catholic demands of social justice (Consejo Pontificio 2005), they chose community organizing as a means to do so -that is, to seek a stronger public voice to address social policy. This aspiration led the regional body of Catholic bishops (the Secretariado Episcopal de America Central, or SEDAC) to reconfigure its social teaching and community-oriented programs to more effectively speak to governing authorities, via a partnership with the U.S.-based PICO National Network.
To understand PICO-Central America, one must see it in contrast to the core work of PICO in the U.S. context. The PICO National Network emphasizes ecumenical and interfaith organizing through established religious congregations. Although the network was founded by an ordained Jesuit priest in 1973, Catholic parishes make up only a minority of its sponsoring institutions, outnumbered by liberal and moderate Protestant and historic African American churches plus smaller contingents from minority religious traditions Wood, Fulton, and Partridge 2012) . The network functions by creating local federations that link 10 to 60 sponsoring congregations to an autonomous organization run by professional staff organizers trained by PICO.
A distinctive element of the congregation-based organizing model lies in its emphasis on the formation of large networks of participants linked to the organizing effort, with sufficient organizational power to keep political officials accountable to constituents (Hart 2001; Speer et al., 2003; Swarts 2008; Warren 2001; Wood 2002) . It does so through "relational organizing", that is, the conscious construction and strengthening of interpersonal networks within civil society, which are then used to project political influence. Participants in this model typically focus on socio-economic issues of interest to low-income communities -typically regarding public education, healthcare, policing or other city services, immigration issues, or housing.
PICO uses "one-to-one" meetings with potential participants and "research meetings" between PICO members and political figures or policy experts to construct an organization that can intervene in the political arena. This process generates social capital, political credibility, and democratic skills, fostering a network of leaders that can project sufficient power to influence political figures and institutions. All this leads to a "political action," whereby a local federation of congregations turns out several hundred to several thousand members before an official holding policy authority over the issue to be addressed. Substantial negotiations between officials and key PICO leaders often precede or follow these events. In its literature and training, PICO-Central America presents three core objectives: (1) The demographic composition of the audience was widely diverse; men and women, young and old, lower and middle classes entered the sanctuary as people knelt in prayer, laughed with excitement, and chatted nervously waiting for the action to commence. Their guests included all four mayors invited from regional cities, as well as the president of the Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada (ANEP, the National Association of Private Industry), a powerful national coordinator of the Salvadoran business class. After an opening procession and the introduction of political officials, Bishop Bolaños delivered an opening talk to frame the action in theological terms:
The Kingdom of God -of faith, fraternity, health, and justice -is revealed here because of our faith; because we have believed in Jesus Christ and the will of God… What our community organizing has come here to say is that active faith, ordained by God, is what we want for this world… [The essence of] Christianity is action and solutions. We are not going to be reduced to mere protesting; we have to construct new methods. This is what they call Christian action. Then, we will bring about the Kingdom of God… El Salvador needs solutions; we want committed people with a pure Christian faith… COFOA is an organization that moves people to necessary action to realize the Christian life; the peace that we have to create, the peace of Christianity through the force of faith. We have to act out our faith in Jesus through relationships with the politicians.
Bolaños thus sought to inspire participants to see their action as part of God's work in the world, and to feel the power of the moment, interpreted simultaneously as the power of God and as the power of democratic life. Following the sermon, a short presentation by lay representatives from each of the five diocesan parishes in attendance presented the list of grievances constructed by that specific community. Six central issues were brought before the invited politicians:
improvement in the upkeep of city streets; improved trash collection; greater accessibility to public health services; better organization of local vendors whose kiosks interfere with the flow of traffic; and a demand to stop the contamination of local river water caused by pollution from the local cheese factory. The first five demands are typically issues in community organizing:
concrete, specific problems that matter in people's lives, and on which the organization can deliver victories and thus begin building a powerful organization. The last demand was particularly crucial: the river supplies drinking water to many residents, and the cheese factory was owned by the ANEP president present at the meeting. Thus, this issue represented a conflict between poor folks' immediate issues of life and health and the economic interests of the Salvadoran elite. In the past, such conflicts have led to outbreaks of violence.
After the presentations of details about each issue and the community's desire for change, each politician and the private entrepreneur was asked by a Catholic lay person: "Are you willing to work with our organization for the improvement of our community?" The politician or entrepreneur was then asked to offer a clear yes or no reply, followed by a timed three minute response.
iii All responded affirmatively. Their subsequent comments included the following:
I want to share this [action] with others in the political system so that they will give the support so that the people can do what they need to do, nationally and internationally.
This is wonderful what you are doing…. I'm not used to talking to the public in this manner.
This type of action is not normal, but it is necessary. I will try my best to grant the people the things they need.
Each political guest agreed to collaborate with COFOA, promised to recruit other regional mayors, and pledged to support programs addressing COFOA's demands. They then signed a large poster publicly announcing their commitment to the resolution of these issues. The bishops, priests and organizers exited in a traditional Catholic procession, officially drawing the action to a close. Meanwhile, the guests and political representatives remained on stage. The audience rose to their feet as animated chatter filled the church, the enthusiasm in the room reminiscent of a religious revival.
Since the success of this first political action, COFOA has remained active in generating public support for community projects and keeping the community engaged in local politics. In The national legislator (diputado) from the FMLN, a local priest who worked in the mountains for years ministering to the guerrillas, endorsed the effort as follows:
Thank you for inviting me. I apologize for arriving late. All three of us congratulate you on your unity, and also because as Christians you are being light and salt for the earth. You are trying to assure that the will of God is done here on earth. Today I am a diputado for the governing party, no longer for the opposition, and we are going to do everything possible. I commit to you, before
God, that that overpass will be under construction as soon as possible. But I want to say one more thing: Do not make me the sole workhorse on this. You must be
[political] workhorses here, be committed to this, so that it is accomplished. widely varying accuracy to that claim). But traditionally the church has spoken "from on high," a clerical voice claiming to speak to societal leaders from a position of higher authority. The liberationist movements articulated a "popular" authority that asserted a democratic intent, but lacked clear democratic authority due to the absence of transparent democratic institutions (those that had existed, for example in El Salvador in the early 1970s, had been negated by military repression and coups). As noted above, both clerical and political authority permeated the action, with religious authority used to constitute a public arena in which political dialogue could occur.
But the fundamental political dynamics occurred on the terrain of democratic accountability:
non-clergy asking political and economic elites to make commitments in front of their constituents, with a significant element of democratic authority brought to bear within the resulting public dialogue.
Second, the elites targeted by the PICO-Central America action -including both political leaders and the often-unreachable economic elite -appeared to accept the norms of accountability presumed in a democratic polity. Note that the elite leaders were required to listen to grassroots demands, were held to a strict timeline of response, and asked to make commitments publicly and in writing. These demands dramaturgically and symbolically represented democratic authority over societal elites -not in the sense of subjugation of authorities, given the respectful tone of the interchanges, but rather in the sense that their authority was treated as legitimate to the extent that it was tied to service to the wider society.
And the politicians' willingness to negotiate with organized constituents represents their acceptance of -or at least acquiescence to -democratic accountability. Such relatively small acts of compliance with democratic political norms, if repeated regularly, may gradually give rise to the habit and expectation of political accountability. This again suggests at least the beginnings of democratic consolidation and the formation of a civil society, Third, in contrast to both the command politics of authoritarian periods and the messianic politics of revolutionary mobilization, COFOA participants carried off the action in a spirit of reform, holding political authorities to standards of democratic accountability while recognizing the legitimacy of their political office. This suggests that the political shifts toward democratic institutions that E. Wood (2001) termed "democracy from below" may be undergoing cultural institutionalization from below as well -an important aspect of democratic consolidation if it is to be sustained over the long term. Moreover, embedded in the shift of power during the action was the fact that here, power was negotiated. In Central American political culture, power has typically been imposed by military and economic elites pursuing their own interests. In contrast, a central element of the COFOA action involved public negotiations regarding subaltern interests.
In sum, these actions represent a break from the political culture of the past in much of the region. In El Salvador -a place of elite imposition of power, quasi-democratic elections manipulated in favor of elite interests, or "revolutionary" mass mobilizations intended and perceived as a threat to political leaders -"the people" collectively denounced social injustice and strove to reform the relationship between the political and civil spheres. Furthermore, religious authority was utilized to convene the public forum in which common people articulated their democratic demands. Of course, a few such events hardly constitute a democratic transformation, but these actions do demonstrate how leaders within PICO-Central America are working to make government more responsive, change policy, and in the process make their respective communities more democratic. The resource mobilization framework argues that the success or failure of social movements is driven by their ability to mobilize resources (McCarthy and Zald 1975) .
"Resources" here may include a variety of inputs necessary for successful mobilization, but the literature has focused particularly on monetary resources and on parlaying the social capital embedded in "mobilizing structures" into social movement participation (Morris 1984; Tarrow 1994; Warren 2001; Wood 2002) . In this section we analyze the ways in which PICO has had to structurally adjust to the resources available in the new social and cultural context. We face our ministry in light of the new evangelization; v but even more, we must renew ourselves and our surroundings to create a rebirth and rejuvenation in our churches. As the Book of Acts states, we must share with those who are in need so there won't be poverty.
As can be seen by this priest's response, religious conviction often serves as a catalyst for political commitment. Thus, mobilization of economic, institutional, and cultural resources was crucial to PICO-Central America's initial success. Yet as we argue below, this was a necessary but not sufficient condition of success.
Challenges Facing PICO-Central America
A number of challenges must be overcome before substantial change will come from these efforts:
Financial dependence. The most immediate challenge to the PICO-Central America's viability may be financial. As the resource mobilization literature argues, one fundamental criterion for social movement success lies in attracting sufficient resources to sustain the movement (McCarthy and Zald 1975) . Related to this is the perception that PICO's involvement may represent a case of what Falk (1993) calls "globalization from above": attempts by elite transnational actors to forge changes in subaltern societies, which he argues amounts to a form of cultural imperialism. Clearly, PICO's presence caused reservations in some participants, simply because it stems from a North American organization. Given the history of the United States' intervention in Central America, an organizational structure that seems norteamericano may produce more repulsion than attraction for Central American Catholics. One priest refusing to take part in PICO's organizing stated simply that "the U.S. cannot be trusted…we would rather drink from our own wells." Fundamentally, how well PICO-Central America integrates local and "imported" elements will be a key determinant of its success. Yet perhaps the most significant cultural obstacle facing PICO is the misperception of PICO's general organizing model. Faith-based community organizing represents a complex skill in any setting (Wood 2002; Swarts 2008; Hart 2001; Warren 2001) , and appeared even more challenging after having been transplanted crossculturally. In the early years of PICO, participants often found training sessions difficult to understand, abstract, and nebulous -especially when they were presented in a highly information-based, lecture-style format. More hands-on, concrete pedagogical techniques popularized in grassroots church circles may be required to engage and sustain Central American participants from subaltern communities.
Plurality vs. Exclusivity. PICO-Central America's fundamental cultural strategy closely parallels that of its parent effort in the U.S. In both settings, PICO uses religious culturesymbols, meanings, and narratives of faith communities -to undergird the organizing effort, generate meaning and motivation within it, and sustain it over the long term. As noted above, however, the PICO-Central America effort has retained an exclusively Catholic organizing base, distinguishing it from the multi-faith, multi-ethnic character of the U.S. PICO model (Wood, Fulton & Partridge 2012) . The question is whether a solely Catholic identity will be an asset or a liability over the long run.
In Central America, where Catholicism is still the majority religion despite the rapid rise of Protestantism (Steigenga and Cleary 2007) , this structural innovation toward Catholic exclusivity might allow PICO to generate greater political support and civic participation. In addition, given its access to economic and cultural resources, tight linkage to the Catholic Church might provide structural support and a shield to absorb attacks from counter-movements (Smith 1991 (Smith , 1994 . Moreover it may serve not only to attract new members, but may also provide subaltern classes with access to governing authorities and the institutional support to hold authorities accountable within a democratic polity.
On the other hand, Evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity represent a surging, albeit fragmented, religious force in the region, in private lives and in the public arena (for recent analyses of Pentecostalism in El Salvador, see IUDOP 2009, Aguilar and Rodriguez 2013, and  especially the chapter by Carmen Guevara in that volume). Effective political action requires a mix of strong ties to constituents and weak ties to diverse sectors (Chwe 1999; Ganz 2000; Wood 2007 ). PICO's new mono-religious approach establishes the strong ties the organization needs, but may lead to a lack of the weak ties outside the Church necessary for reaching out to broader constituencies and increasing civic participation. How PICO balances these needs will shape its future trajectory.
Collective Action Framing and the Resurrection of Catholic Political Action PICO-Central America's future is of course difficult to discern. On one hand, historical legacies and the above challenges may overwhelm the fledgling organizing effort. "Activism" in Central America often provokes painful memories of militant attempts at national social reform, massacres of liberation activists and theologians, and widespread political repression. Despite PICO-Central America's peaceful, collaborative approach to organizing, it is nonetheless a social movement organization aimed at democratic accountability within highly unequal societies. As such, it can be perceived by elite actors as a threat to the status quo -and could thus provoke repression leading to movement failure.
On the other hand, PICO-Central America might emerge as a locally-grown model of faith-based organizing, integrally combining elements from the Latin American pastoral social and from PICO's experience in North America. In the latter case, current evidence clearly suggests PICO-Central America will shed the revolutionary eschatology of past insurgencies in favor of a commitment to societal reform via democratic political institutions. How radical such a reform agenda might be is difficult to predict: the profound social inequalities and historic lack of elite accountability will push the effort in a more radical direction, while the authority of the Catholic bishops over the effort (and their very cautious political instincts) will push in a much more moderate direction. Such an effort might either fall into the attenuated horizons of the weaker faith-based community organizing efforts in the U.S., settling for marginal local influence; or might adopt the tone and tenor of the more sophisticated such U.S. efforts, incorporating their best practices and democratic ethos into Central American church and society.
Beyond these factors, PICO-Central America's advances thus far may be attributed to the organization's "framing" of the collection action process, using transcendent language and imagery drawn partly from liberation theology (Benford and Snow 2000) . 
Conclusion
Because PICO-Central America is still in the early stages of the social movement lifecycle, it is premature to assess its overall impact on Central American civil society. However, PICO-Central America's initial success suggests that its organizational strategies of structural innovation and religious framing may offer an effective vehicle for promoting social policy change and democratic consolidation in the region. More broadly, it may represent a vehicle through which Catholic hierarchical authority can foster -intentionally or inadvertently -the emergence of a public arena in which political and economic elites can be held democratically accountable. That is, although Catholic hierarchical authority is not itself democratic, PICOCentral America may be able to draw on that authority to construct public arenas of democratic deliberation by i) bringing elites into the public arena; and ii) fostering grassroots mobilization to hold those elites accountable to the interests of local communities; and iii) doing so within an organizing effort committed to democratic politics. If Central American participants repeatedly enact such a process over many years, they may successfully confront the democratic challenges of their societies. In the process they will help "deepen democracy" in the region (Roberts 1998 ). anti-violence strategies. This led to a "march for peace" with 700 participants, culminating in a meeting with the departmental heads of the police and army, the mayor of Zacatecoluca, and the bishop. In another key initiative, COFOA convinced the national vice minister of health to work with the organization to provide training workshops on getting their health needs met and to address the scarcity of medicines in public hospitals.
In Guatemala, PICO's leadership development work is less advanced, with 35 core leaders from 2 large parishes engaged as of 2013. The effort focuses on security in the area around Pastores, Sacatepequez. In early 2013 the effort is seeking to engage 5,000 local people to work on violence reduction (leading to prevention workshops, a march, and a large public meeting with officials).
PICO's regional organizer Alberto Vasquez sums up the effort's gradual impact on grassroots political culture this way:
People [generally] do not think they have power to change anything, do not really realize democracy is possible. They are realizing now that democracy is possible only if they are involved in public life. Before realizing this, democracy was dead;
no one really believed in democracy. Now they are starting to feel their powerhad a meeting with vice minister of health, came out realizing that they can gain real power, that they can start to improve their lives. This is the new way to do democracy in Central America vii .
The PICO-Central America effort currently runs on a $153,000 annual budget and employs five organizers. Every two months some 65 core leaders gather for training, and a smaller "Planning and Strategy Committee" meets in alternate months to make key decisions.
The effort to diversify PICO's internal structure via collaboration with CRS has thrived, but less so with Caritas. In the near future, Vasquez hopes to expand into Honduras in collaboration with Cardinal Rodríguez Maradiaga, and then to address regional issues including the impact of mining on water supplies in the "northern triangle" of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras).
The challenges identified above continue: For example, essentially all funding still comes from U.S. and European sources. viii Likewise, the tension between emphasizing a Catholic-only public presence or embodying more of the religious diversity that today characterizes Central America remains. One Anglican church in El Salvador has joined the effort -but the far more substantial question of the effort's relationship to the burgeoning Evangelical/Pentecostal sector remains. More progress has occurred on the issue of cross-cultural translation, with local organizers, leaders, and priests engaged. But the most active priests are often foreign-born, and
Vasquez notes that as a Mexican national who spent years in the U.S., much cross-cultural translation is still required.
Overall, the "northern triangle" region may indeed be witnessing the slow re-emergence of Catholic collective action. In no country does PICO-Central America have the scale to forge a truly democratic public sphere at the national level. However, via its impact on political culture at the grassroots and among local elected officials, its work holds promise as one contribution to "the new way to do democracy in Central America". officials into the public arena, and there ask them to commit publicly to specific policy proposals or to working with the sponsoring organization to address a specific issue. iv The phrase translated using "workhorse" here is a colloquialism, "no me montan el macho…que ustedes sean los machos aqui." "Machos" can refer either to masculine men, or to the male horse or other work animal on a farm. v The "new evangelization" or "nueva evangelizacion" is a phrase introduced by Pope John Paul II in the mid twentieth century to revitalize the mission work of Catholics worldwide. The concept presents such mission work as dedicated to transforming cultural assumptions and societal institutions that undermine human communities, in addition to spreading the Christian gospel. 
